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IV 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VINCENT CHIODO, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. ~ Ca1s0e47N3o. BEAR RIVER 'i'ELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. 1 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'f 
STATElHENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The plaintiff, Vincent Chiodo, sought recovery 
from defendant, Bear River Telephone Company, for 
breach of an employment agreement executed between 
plaintiff and defendant. This contract was part of a 
larger transaction wherein General Waterworks Cor-
poration acquired the controlling interest in the Bear 
Rircr Telephone Company from the plaintiff and certain 
members of his family. Plaintiff contended that this 
contract of employment was a condition to the sale 
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of the majority stock of Bear River and that it provided 
him a guaranteed employment for IO years with no right 
in Bear River to terminate his employment or, at least. 
the payments required thereunder. Defendant, Bear 
River Telephone Company, admitted it had entered into 
a IO-year contract of employment with plaintiff but 
cliamed such contract was terminable for cause and that 
plaintiff's termination was justifiable and a result of his 
insubordination. Plaintiff replied that even if such con-
tract could be interpreted to give the defendant the 
right to terminate him for cause, that defendant did not 
have such cause in this case and that the termination 
was done willfully, maliciously and without justification. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court without a jury and 
the court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment in favor of the plaintiff finding that 
plaintiff had carried out his employment duties as gen-
eral manager of defendant faithfully and efficiently, 
that defendant terminated the contract of employment 
without just cause and excuse, and in violation of 1b 
terms and that such termination was unwarranted. The 
Court concluded that defendant must pay plaintiff the 
total of the salary contracted less a discount for pay-
ment in advance, together with an amount agreed upon 
by the parties owing on a retirement policy, which was 
part of the employment agreement and entered J udg-
ment for the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum 
of $8I,264.99. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the Judgment and 
Judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing, 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because this is a case requiring a full understand-
ing of the facts and circumstances and because Appel-
lant's "STATEMENT OF FACTS" consists mainly 
of argument and a recital of defendant's contentions, 
plaintiff deems it necessary to submit the following 
statement of facts: 
(A) PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff, Vincent Chiodo, devoted his life work 
to the telephone industry. Leaving college in 1925, he 
worked for the Bell Telephone Company accumulating 
experience and some capital until 1943, when he acquired 
controlling interest in the Bear River Telephone Com-
pany. Plaintiff managed and controlled the destinies of 
this company from 1943, when it was then just serving 
the town of Tremonton and had approximately 700 
stations, until the end of 1960, when it had grown to 
approximately 5,000 stations. During this period plain-
tiff and members of his family acquired additional out-
standing shares of Bear River Telephone Company so 
that by 1960 they owned approximately two-thirds of 
all outstanding stock. All members of plaintiff's family 
ll'orked in the telephone operation with his wife and 
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daughter working intermittently in the office, and his 
two sons working at various jobs as they grew up, 
finally becoming key employees in the operation. 
Late in 1959, plaintiff concluded that it would be 
advisable to sell control of the company to an organi-
zation with sufficient capital to supply the facilities 
needed to satisfy the constantly increasing demand for 
services. While the company was financially sound and 
making good earnings, plaintiff felt it did not have 
adequate capital available to keep pace with the rapid 
growth of the area. He decided to sell control to an 
organization sufficiently large to furnish the required 
financing for expansion, provided such organization 
was not purchasing the company in order to resell it and 
provided, further, that he would be given a management 
contract until he reached the age of 65 years, which 
would give him a continuing free rein in the manage-
ment and operation of the company for IO years. 
After preliminary discussions with certain pro-
spective purchasers, plaintiff began negotiations with 
General Waterworks Corporation. Numerous discus-
sions were held over a considerable period of time as to 
the terms of the sale and as to the terms of plaintiff's 
employment contract. The sale of the outstanding stock 
to General Waterworks was consummated at the end 
of the year 1960 and plaintiff began his employment 
under his management contract, which was then signed, 
with Bear River at the beginning of the year 1961. 
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(8) CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
Because of plaintiff's firm intention to retain the 
management and control of operations of Bear River 
Telephone Company with a substantial salary and the 
attendant prestige of the position until his retirement, 
he had extensive conversations with representatives of 
General Waterworks Corporation regarding this re-
quirement and the contract of employment that would 
afford him these rights. It was recognized by all of the 
parties that while the contract of employment would be 
between Bear River Telephone Company and the plain-
tiff, the understanding and agreement concerning the 
terms of the contract had to be negotiated and resolved 
by the officers of General Waterworks Corporation 
whose acts and representations would then be ratified 
and adopted by Bear River after the stock sale was 
made. (Exhibit l) 
Mr. Helmer Hansen, an attorney in Chicago, Illi-
11ois, was hired by General Waterworks to represent 
it in the acquisition of Bear River Telephone Company 
and to work out the provisions of the stock exchange 
and the plaintiff's employment contract so that it would 
ronstitute a tax-free exchange. (R. 144, 142.) l\Ir. 
Hansen acknowledged that one of the required condi-
tions in the stock sale was a ten-year employment con-
tract insisted upon by the plaintiff (R. 142}. Mr. Hansen 
also acknowledged that the plaintiff with his managerial 
employment contract, wanted to retain the autonomy 
1111rl freedom that he had been used to in the past in his 
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operation of the company (R. 146, 156). 
Mr. A. W. Sanders, Vice-President of General 
Waterworks and the manager of all of the telephont 
utilities owned by General Waterworks, was the com-
pany officer who, together with Mr. Helmar Hansen, 
negotiated the stock purchase agreement and employ-
ment agreement on behalf of General Waterworks. He 
was present at the two initial meetings in Chicago with 
plaintiff, which were also attended by Helmer Hansen. 
Following these meetings Mr. Sanders came out to 
Tremonton where he conducted further negotiations 
with the plaintiff (R. 27}. Part of these negotiations 
consisted of a discussion held at Logan, Utah, on August 
3, 1960, between Mr. Sanders and plaintiff, which was 
stenographically reported by Mr. George Parker, Court 
Reporter for the First District. The stenographic tran-
script of this meeting signed by both Mr. Sanders and 
Mr. Chiodo is in evidence as Exhibit 1. 
In this discussion Mr. Sanders and the plaintiff 
explored very thoroughly the scope of the powers and 
duties which plaintiff would have as manager of Bear 
River Telephone Company when the stock ownership 
in the company passed to General \Vaterworks as well 
as his manner of compensation. Mr. Sanders' assurances 
to plaintiff's conditions and demands were broad and 
extensive, and a literal reading of these assurances seem-
ingly guarantees to plaintiff the agreed wage of $12,000 
per year, plus certain insurance benefits for a full period 
of ten years, regardless of whether plaintiff carried out 
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his duties of manager or not. The following excerpt 
from this discussion begins on Page 27 of Exhibit 1, at 
J[ne 18: 
MR. CHI ODO: I don't want to have this 
thing come up here with me. I want it tied down 
so that there's no question about it, and you 
decide to fire me, that you're going to pay my 
$500.00 every two weeks for ten years. 
MR. SANDERS: My opinion of this is that 
we can't fire you for ten years. That's what Han-
sen tell me. Now-
MR. CHIODO: '7\Tell, then your opinion is 
that this contract is ironbound, that the General 
'7\T aterworks is bound to keep me employed. 
lVIR. SANDERS: The Bear River Tele-
phone Company. 
MR. CHIODO: To keep me employed. I 
don't care about the telephone company once 
you own it. You can let her go to seed, but I 
want the paycheck every month. 
MR. SANDERS: You're going to be just 
as interested in Bear River after this is over with 
as you are now. 
MR. CHIODO: '7\Tell, assuming I lose my in-
terest for a price, which I question, but you 
never know what will happen. 
lVIR. SANDERS: 'Vell, the only thing I 
hesitate on that is getting back to the legal end 
of it. I think this stock trade could be affected 
by saying we're paying you so much, see, Vince. 
I think that's the only reason. I would see no 
objections to it. · 
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MR. CHIODO: You have no objections to 
tying it down so that we don't have to go to 
court to keep this in force? 
MR. SANDERS: I don't see why we haw 
to. You got the contract here. 
l\1R. CHIODO: Yeah, but I can't write mv-
self a check for $500.00 payday if you refuse to 
sign the check; then what? I'm fired; right? 
MR. SANDERS: No. I'm no attorney, of 
course, but the attorneys tell me this is all your 
way. 'iVe can't do anything . 
lVIR. CHIODO: 'Vell, you see, I'm talking 
out of school now, because the attorney hasn't 
given me an opinion, but I do read this in the 
paper. 
l\IR. SANDERS: Of course, you don't know 
what all the facts of that thing were. 
MR. CHIODO: No, I don't, but that same 
thing coulrl be applicable to any employment 
contract, because this prC'J>ably will set the pat-
tern in Utah. this decision. 
MR. SANDERS: Yeah, it could. Well, we'd 
better Jet him see that and talk to him when we 
get back to Tremonton. 
l\iR. CHIODO: 'Ve)~. I think I'd want some 
mention made of how valid, to what extent I 
can go to keep this contract in force. Okeh. Xow 
I've read the vacation schedules and all the other 
terms affecting employment. To what extent will 
I be governed by hard and fast employment 
rules in order to qualify for the pay? In other 
words, I'm making reference to working nn atld1-
tional Saturday, if not all Saturdays. And tlwn 
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deciding I'm going to take two or three months 
off when the occasion arises. If you decide that 
I'm not going to take this time off or I'm not 
gonig to take this vacation, you decide against 
ine, you say, "Hell, this thing says $12,000 a 
year at the rate of $500.00 semi-monthly install-
ments, you're going to be gone two month~­
we'll just dock you $2,000 bucks." 
lVIR. SANDERS: No. As you and I dis-
cussed before, we're going to let you run the 
property as you see fit. 
l\lR. CHIODO: Yeah, but do I have to stay 
right here and run it evecy minute, or do I have 
a chance to take a couple of months off if I so 
desire'? 
MR. SANDERS: You can do that. 
l\1R. CHIODO: You're being awfully easy 
to get along with. 
l\ifR. SANDERS: 'Vell, I think we have an 
understanding in advance. You're not going to 
take very many couple of months off. 
lVlR. CI-II ODO: 'Vell, I don't know. 
l\fR. SANDERS: I'm quite sure of that. 
l\'IR. CHIODO: "Tell, I'm not going to make 
any commitments now, if you're looking at my 
face and guessing that, I'm going to let you go 
ahead and guess. 'Vill you buy it that way? 
l\IR. SANDERS: Yes. 
A reading of all of Exhibit I reveals that plaintiff 
in this recorded discussion with Mr. Sanders, was ex-
tremely frank and candid. He clearly expressed his 
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desire for independence in his management and control 
of the Bear River operation and received assurances 
that this would continue in the future after the stock 
sale, much as it had in the past. Plaintiff, on several 
occasions, indicated that he wanted to avoid someone 
getting peeved with him because of his personality or 
manner of doing business and that he wanted autonomy 
so that the operations would not be affected by tempera-
ment. See for example page 19 of Exhibit I, where 
plaintiff states he wants his authorization clear so that 
they can avoid any "clash of personalities." At page 29, 
Mr. Sanders states "as you and I discussed before, we 
are going to let you run the property as you see fit" 
and after acknowledging at page 32, that this was the 
plaintiff's life work, stated on page 37 that plaintiff 
would be sure to run Bear River for ten years. 
The intent of the parties is clear throughout this 
transcript that plaintiff was to perform the duties as 
manager and be given broad powers of management so 
long as he operated the company efficiently and profit-
ably. Furthermore, that in all events he was to recei\'t 
the $120,000 over a period of ten years by semimonthly 
payments of $500.00. At the conclusion of the tran-
scribed discussion it was expressly agreed that the tran-
script would be the governing factor in any future 
disputes and that if any questions might arise in tlw 
future they should be settled on the basis of th~ discus-
sion that day. (See page 45 of Exhibit I.) 
To insure that he could rely on the transcribed 
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discussion, plaintiff insisted before he would agree to 
sign the stock sales agreement that he be given assurance 
uv General 'Vaterworks that this transcript under-
standing, Exhibit 1, was authorized, understood and 
approved by General Waterworks and would be hon-
ored by Bear River Telephone Company after control 
had passed ( R. 30 and 36) . The assurance demanded 
by plaintiff was given him by the telegram of November 
8, 1960, from James Jennings, Secretary and General 
Counsel for General Waterworks (Exhibit 2) . This 
telegram followed the letter of November 4, 1960, to 
plaintiff (Exhibit 5) wherein General Waterworks, 
through Vice-President V. F. Rig ling, said: 
"This letter is written to confirm our under-
standing with you that in the event that such 
exchange transaction is consummated, and our 
nominees are then elected to the Board of Di-
rectors of Bear River Telephoiie Company, we 
will then cause Bear River Telephone Company 
to enter into an employment agreement with you, 
for a period of ten years, such agreement to be 
in the form attached hefeto with such changes 
therein as may be agreed to." 
The telegram demanded by plaintiff following this 
letter was intended by the parties to reflect an agreed 
change in the form agreement by incorporating by 
reference therein the transcript .As this was the same 
form uf agreement approved by Bear River, the same 
incorporation would be effected and understood. 
Helmer Hansen, defendant's attorney and repre-
~,f'lltative in the negotiations with the plaintiff, acknowl-
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edged that plaintiff insisted on an affirmation of this 
Logan Transcript before he would sign the final draft 
of the employment agreement (R. 151, 152). Mr. 
Hansen admitted that the sending of the telegram 
affirming the Logan Transcript was a condition to the 
plaintiff's accepting the whole deal ( R. 152). Mr. 
Hansen further acknowledged that he knew the sending 
of the telegram was to affect the incorporation by ref-
erence of the understanding recited in the Logan Tran-
script into the terms of the employment contract and 
that this was done for the purpose of satisfying plaintiff 
as to the final draft of the employment contract ( R. l.53, 
154). 
Following the final agreement by General \Vater-
works of plaintiff's conditions relating to the employ-
ment agreement, the plaintiff, on December 21, 1960, 
finally signed the stock purchase sales agreement (Ex-
hibit 3), which had been prepared under date of Sep-
tember 23, 1960 ( R. 35) . The stock sale was then im-
plemented and a new Bear River Board of Directors 
was voted in, vesting control of Bear River into General 
\Vaterworks. This was accomplished at a Hear River 
Board of Directors meeting held on January 3, 191il. 
(Exhibit 7), pursuant to the agreements and under-
standings that had been reached between plaintiff and 
the officers of General \Vaterworks, who, thereupon 
became the officers of Bear River ( R. 87, 88) . The 
Board, at this same meeting, authorized the ten-year 
employment agreement that had been promised plain-
tiff. Following this, the simple two-page letter document 
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reflecting such agreement and which expressly incorpo-
rated all prior understandings regardiHg it, was signed 
for Bear River by A. M. Sanders, Executive Vice-
President; the same A. \V. Sanders who had negotiated 
the employment agreement on behalf of General \Vater-
1rorks (Exhibit 6). 
The letter contract of employment provided that 
plaintiff would be hired as manager of Bear River Tele-
phone Company for a period of ten years at a salary of 
$12,000 per year, together with a payment on a life 
insurance contract. The contract was in the same form 
and language theretofore submitted to Plaintiff by 
General \Vaterworks and stated that it was "written 
to confirm our understanding with you concerning your 
continuing employment by Bear River and the nature 
of your duties." This contract, confirming a prior under-
standing reftects the intent of the parties that it incor-
porates by that language the express prior understand-
ing theretofore had with respect to plaintiff's employ-
ment. namely the detailed management agreement re-
flected in the approved transcript. Throughout these 
prior negotiations and discussions it was, of course, con-
templated that General \Va terworks as the controlling 
~tockholder would direct the affairs of Bear River Tele-
phone Company and that Bear River Telephone Com-
pa11y, immediately after passing under the control of 
Ueneral \Vaterworks, would by this letter contract, con-
firm and ratify the previous discussions and agreements. 
(C) DEFENDANT'S WILFULL BREACH 
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The evidence presented in the trial showed that 
almost immediately after the acquisition of Bear River 
by General 'Vaterworks, the officers of General 'Vater-
works, and Bear River began violating the terms and 
spirit of plaintiff's employment contract in that they 
did not allow plaintiff the latitude of action and re-
sponsibility of management that he had insisted on as 
a condition of the sale and which had been assured him 
in the negotiations. This led to the type of misunder-
standings predicted by the plaintiff in the transcript 
between himself, as Manager, and certain staff men 
situated in the New London, Iowa, offices of General 
Waterworks. 
Despite these restrictions, annoyances and frustra-
tions, plaintiff continued to manage Bear River Tele-
phone Company in a highly efficient and profitable 
manner. The record shows that this company was the 
most prosperous of all the General Waterworks proper· 
ties and had the highest net income per station, highest 
return on investment and the highest return on the net 
plant (R. 126, 127). Defendant's officers acknowledged 
at the trial that plaintiff throughout his management 
did a good job servicing Bear River customers (R. 192) 
and that he rendered good and adequate service to the 
largest and most demanding customer, Thiokol (R 
198). 
The true intentions of the new ownership with 
respect to their commitment to the plaintiff were indi-
cated in April of 1961 when the Articles of Incorpora-
14 
tion were amended to provide for a procedure to remove 
officers for cause. The following July plaintiff was 
summoned to Denver by the new Bear River Executive 
\'ice-President, Mr. Sanders, and there advised that a 
trade was being negotiated by General Waterworks 
whereby :Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Com-
pany would acquire Bear River and that plaintiff would 
be terminated ( R. 141). 
The evidence in the trial introduced by the def en-
dant in an attempt to support its contentions that the 
plaintiff had not been a dutiful, loyal employee, rather 
than proving such fact, merely showed how plaintiff was 
continuously hampered and interfered with in his rr..rrr~­
agement of the operations of Bear River Telephone 
Company, contrary to the assurances that he had been 
given prior to his sale of his controlling interest, which 
commitments defendant's officers knew were required 
in order to acquire the company. Rather than being 
able to continue the "one-man operation" that Helmer 
Hansen admitted plaintiff insisted upon as a con-
dition of the sale (R. 156), plaintiff found himself 
subject to direction from not just Mr. Sanders, but 
all of the Bear River officers located in General ':V ater-
work's New London office (R. 192). Donald Bell, the 
successor to A. W. Sanders as Executive Vice-President 
of Bear River Telephone Company, acknowledged to 
the plaintiff in October of 1963 that "obviously you 
have a lot of reason for complaint and that one reason 
I am out here, frankly, is to see what we can do, what 
I can do, or what I can for our general office procedures. 
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I would like to have them changed so we will give you 
the kind of help and cooperation that you should have 
and that you want" ... (sic) (R. 95). 
On December 12, 1963, plaintiff received Exhibit 
17, a letter purporting to discharge him as manager of 
the Bear River Telephone Company. Since that date, 
Bear River Telephone Company failed and refused to 
pay him any salary or other compensation and failed to 
pay the premium on the life insurance policy which was 
part of his employment agreement. Plaintiff was unable 
to find any steady employment following the termina-
tion by Bear River and despite continuous efforts to 
obtain other employment was only able to find work 
for a few days prior to the trial (R. 45, 46). 
The Notice of Termination of December 12th 
(Exhibit 17) , came from the home off ice in New Lon-
don, Iowa and advised the plaintiff that the specific 
charge against him on which he was being removed as 
an officer and employee was 
"I. That you failed to comply in any manner 
1 
with five specific instructions issued to you by the 
Vice-President and General .Manager in his letter 
of November 19, 1963." 
In the defense presented by the defendant corporation, 
little, if any, evidence was presented with respect to this 
specific charge or how plaintiff failed to comply with 
such instructions. Prior to the formal letter of termina-
tion dated December 12, Mr. Chiodo received a letter 
dated December 3, advising him he was being relieyed 
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of his responsibilities as manager as of that date and 
that a special meeting of directors was being called for 
December 10th, 1963, to remove him as an officer of the 
company (Exhibit 49). These actions were also based 
upon the so-called specific charge of failure to respond 
to the "five specific instructions" of then Vice-President 
and General Manager of Bear River, Donald Bell, in 
his letter of November 19, 1963. This series of events 
is chronicled and the charges contained in the letter of 
November 19th replied to by .Mr. Calvin L. Rampton, 
munsel for plaintiff, in his letter directed to Mr. Donald 
Bell, dated December 6, 1963 (Exhibit 48). 
The letter of December 3rd to the plaintiff from 
Mr. Bell notifying him he was relieved of all duties and 
responsibilities as of the close of business December 6, 
1963, concluded by offering plaintiff the right to resign 
prior to the Board .Meeting and indicated that if he 
would agree to resign, the Board would be asked ta 
consider a termination payment (Exhibit 49) . 
. l\lr. A. "\V. Sanders, Executive Vice-President of 
Bear River Telephone Company and the man who had 
Hcgotiated the acquisition of Bear River for General 
\Y aterworks and the employment contract with the 
plaintiff, died and was replaced by Mr. Donald Bell in 
April of 1963. Bell claimed that shortly after he assumed 
his position that he was told that he could fire plaintiff 
at anv time he wanted to and that he finally fired him . . 
"because he was impossible to live with" (R. 176). Bell 
acknowledged that plaintiff wasn't fired because of the 
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rate of return General 'Vaterworks was obtai11ing on 
its net investment in Bear River, which was some :H;~ 
in 1963, the best rate of any company owned by General 
'Vaterworks (R. 176). 
Defendant's attempted proof of justification in 
terminating plaintiff consisted in the main of certain 
correspondence indicating some friction and clashes of 
personality similar to that which plaintiff had antiei-
pated and hoped to avoid in his transcribed discussion 
with )Ir. Sanders in Logan prior to the sale. These 
difficulties arose from the new owner's failure to giYe 
plaintiff the independence promised him in the company. 
The other evidence offered by plaintiff which con-
sumed much of the trial was in regard to certain eo11-
tracts that were let by Bear River to one .Max Fonnes-
beck, a general contractor. Defendant attempted to 
establish or at least imply that the plaintiff permitted 
his two sons, who were key employees of Hear RiYer, 
to improperly moonlight on these Fonnesbeck contracts. 
The e''idence, however, established that these Fonnes-
beck contracts were let and Bear River employees used 
thereon at the suggestion and with the full knowledge 
of A. ,V. Sanders and, further, that most emplo~·ee' 
of Bear River were required to be employed at rnrirn1~ 
times in order to complete the work to be performe(l 
under these contracts ( R. 225, 226). The testimon~· 
of .Mr. Fonnesbeck and Grant Allred, a subcontractur. 
merely confirmed that the plaintiff and his two son' 
were excellent telephone men and honest and loyal cw-
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ployees of llear River Telephone Company. The eYi-
dent'e disclosed that sueh work as was done during the 
Bear !liver working hours had actually been Bear RiYer 
"·ork, and not contract work as defendant attempted 
to show. 
Defendant's intention to attempt by any means 
possible to justify the termination of plaintiff's employ-
ment eon tract was a1111om1eed by the defendant's counsel, 
James L. )lorrison, in his letter of Deeemher !:), I ~rn:3, 
(Exhibit :39), wherein he ach·ised plaintiff's counsel, 
Mr. Cah·i11 L. Rampton, that Bear RiYer's defense 
would "ha ,.e to constitute an attempt to destroy "'.\Ir. 
Chiodo." The malice and had faith which motiYated 
defendant in its actions toward plaintiff are reflected, 
not only by this letter and the history of the transaction 
as shown in the evidenee, but also by the actions taken 
against the plaintiff's two sons, Don awl Gene Chiodo. 
These 111e11 who had grown up in this company were 
summarily dismissed on .l\Iarch Ii3, 1964. Prior to this 
dismissal there had never been any complaints about the 
performance of work by these two men (R. 1::20, 123) 
awl the evidence indicates they had been performing 
their work in a satisfactory manner. They were, how-
cnT, given termination slips stating their work was un-
satisfactory. Defendant admitted that the termination 
slip~ were erroneous and that Gene and Don Chiodo 
\\'ere not terminated because of their work, but rather 
he('ause the were "fomenting trouble" (R. 174). Defen-
dants di<l uot attempt to produce any evidence to sub-
~tantiate this charge. 
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The reason that General "\Vaterworks was willing 
to make any promises necessary to acquire the valuable 
Bear River property became clear through the sale Gen-
eral Waterworks finally succeeded in making of this 
property several months prior to the trial when they 
sold the Bear River stock ownership for some sixteen 
times what they had paid for it (R. 93). Howard Butler, 
a former employee of General Waterworks in its New 
London offices, testified that he had overheard a conver-
sation between officers of the defendant that plaintiff 
had been given his contract with broad management 
powers because that was the only way they could buy 
the Bear River Company (R. 128). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND DE-
FENDANT DID NOT HA VE CAUSE FOR 
PLAINTIFF'S TERl\iINATION. 
Defendant's first argument implies that the trial 
court found that the employment contract in issue could 
not be terminated, even for cause, without liability. This 
is not the fact, for the trial court bottomed its judgment 
for the plaintiff on the conclusion that the defendant's 
termination of the plaintiff's ten-year employment con-
tract "was without just and sufficient cause and was in 
violation of the terms and provisions of the employment 
agreement between the parties." This language is found 
in paragraph 4 of the Court's Conclusions of Law, and 
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Court's Findings of Fad 
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support and amplify this conclusion. 
It appears to be the defendant's contention that 
the two-page letter agreement was intended by the par-
ties to integrate fully the understanding and agreement 
regarding plaintiff's employment, and that the parties, 
and particularly the plaintiff, thereby revoked and nulli-
fied all of the previous negotiations and understandings 
that had been reached regarding plaintiff's employment. 
Such a contention is totally without support in the 
record of this trial. 
Certainly this was no ordinary employment agree-
ment, as defendants apparently want the court to be-
iieYe, for Vincent Chiodo was in a strong bargaining 
position when he negotiated the terms and conditions of 
his employment. He had a valuable telephone company 
that General Waterworks wanted to acquire. He laid 
down some stringent conditions to such acquisition, 
which General 'Vaterworks accepted and which it had 
Bear River ratify and affirm after General Waterworks 
acquired the ownership of Bear River. These conditions 
included the right to continue to manage Bear River 
much as he had in the past, and the promise that he 
1rnuld not be fired unless Bear River continued to be 
obligated to pay his salary. Plaintiff wanted the con-
tinuing financial security of employment from the com-
pa11y that he had built from modest beginnings into a 
substantial utility company, and also the continuing 
prestige, challenge and responsibility of management, 
and he wanted these things without strings. (See the 
transcript discussion, Exhibit I, and particularly the 
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language on page 27, line 18, and continuing to the end 
of page 29.) 
It is therefore true that one of the plaintiff's co11-
tentions was that the employment contract guaranteed 
that plaintiff would not be terminated from his job in 
such a way that he would lose the salary payments pro-
vided for. Defendant's response to this contention was 
not a denial that such a promise was made, but rather 
that it was made by General Waterworks in its acqui-
sition of Bear River, and not by Bear River. The obvious 
answer to this confession and avoidance was that al-
though the contract was negotiated and agreed upon by 
officers of General 'Vaterworks as a condition of acquir-
ing Bear River, that the promises and agreements then 
made were later ratified and adopted by Bear River 
through the very same officers, who then spoke for Bear 
River as well as General Waterworks. 
Whether or not this employment contract could or 
could not be terminated by defendant without liability 
for cause is, however, moot in light of the court's find-
ings and conclusions that defendant did not in any eyent 
have justifiable cause for plaintiff's discharge, and th11'; 
the defendant's general statements of law under its 
Point I while interesting, are in no way controlling. 
II. THE ACTIONS OF VINCENT CHI· 
ODO DURING THE COURSE OF HIS EM· 
PLOYMENT \VITH BEAR RIVER TELE-
PHONE CO)IPANY 'VERE NOT INCONSIS-
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'l'~N'l' "\\TITH THE RELATIONSHIP OF 
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT AND BEAR 
RIVER TELEPIIONE DID NOT HAVE 
GOOD CAUSE FOR HIS DISCHARGE. 
The plaintiff has no argument with the general 
statements of law cited by the defendant-appellant that 
if the court finds that plaintiff had no guarantee of con-
tinuing payment as part of his contract that defendant 
could have discharged the plaintiff without liability if 
it had had substantial reasonable cause for such dis-
charge. Defendant's brief asserts a number of acts 
which it contends plaintiff engaged in during the course 
of his employment that were inconsistent with the em-
ployer-employee relationship and therefore constituted 
good cause for plaintiff's discharge. It is interesting 
to note that none of these acts were asserted or occurred 
at the time of plaintiff's discharge, and that they were 
all subsequently dredged up by defendant in the defense 
of this suit. Defendant's alleged reason for terminating 
plaintiff in December of 1963 was because of plaintiff's 
supposed failure in complying with certain instructions 
from President Donald Bell in November of that year 
(Exhibit 17). Defendant essentially abandoned this 
reason as a defense because it affirmatively appeared 
that plaintiff had in fact substantially complied with the 
letter requirements of President Bell and to the fullest 
extent possible (Exhibit 48}. 
Defendant sets forth five specific breaches upon 
which it finally relied to justify plaintiff's discharge. 
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They were the following: Payroll padding; insubordi- , 
nation; disclosure of confidential information; failure 
to render proper accounts; and failure to communicate 
information. Def en<lant attempts to substantiate these 
serious sounding charges by reciting under each heading 
only those facts defendant attempted to establish with-
out setting forth the facts presented by the plaintiff on 
which the Court made its Findings. 
It is, of course, fundamental in a case such as this 
that the plaintiff, having prevailed, is entitled to the 
benfit of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable 
to him, together with every inference and intentment 
fairly or reasonably arising therefrom. McCollum v. , 
Clothier, 121 U. 3ll, 241 P.2d 468. Because of this it 1 
is imperative that all pertinent facts are recited, and 
particularly those upon which the plaintiff relied. Plain- ' 
tiff will therefore answer each of defendant's following 
charges with a recital of the facts regarding each alleged 
breach. 
(Al PAYROLL PADDING 
Defendant relies upon the case of Dixie Glass Com-
pany v. Pollak, 341 S.,V. 2d, 530, 91 A.L.R. 2d fi62 
(Tex. Cir. App. 1960) and particularly the language 
of this case indicating that "aggravated cases of refusal 
to obey reasonable orders of the employer that amounted 
to insubordination, or cases of purely dishonest acts to-
ward an employer on the part of the employee in the 
attempted performance of employee's work, or acts such 
as an unprovoked fight by an employee with an officer 
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of the employer in the presence of other employees con-
stitute good cause for discharge." Plaintiff has no com-
plaint with this case or the rule pronounced thereby, but 
submits that defendant presented no eYidence establish-
ing that the plaintiff was guilty of clearly dishonest acts, 
or aggravated cases of refusal to obey. 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff falsified payroll 
records of his son, Don Chiodo, and directed other em-
ployees of Bear River Telephone Company to falsify 
Don Chiodo's payroll records, all of which resulted in 
payroll padding and illegal and improper payments to 
Don Chiodo. The evidence presented by defendant 
attempting to justify each charge was simply that Don 
Chiodo worked for some 9 days in :Montana with a con-
tractor by the name of Max Fonnesbeck in November 
of 1%2, and that during all of this time he remained on 
the Bear River payroll. These facts were undisputed 
by the plaintiff, as was the answering testimony that 
Dou Chiodo had this time coming to him because of 
'rnrk that he had been required to do for Bear River 
during his vacation period and some extensive night 
r.ork which he had performed for Bear RiYer withoul 
(liargc (R. 546, 547, 548). That there was nothing 
wrongful or hidden with respect to Don Chiodo's taking 
nine days off was further borne out by the fact that the 
em11loyee who entered the additional time on Don's 
reeord admitted that plaintiff had told him that if he 
ercr had any trouble with the New London officers, 
al}(l if they tried to fire him, he wanted all employees 
1o tell the truth, indicating plaintiff's clear conscience 
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and freedom from guilt ( R. 465) . 
While all of defendant's claims of justification in 
discharging plaintiff appear contrived and inadequate, 
the most feeble attempt to discredit plaintiff comes in 
the accusation that plaintiff knowingly permitted Don 
and Gene Chiodo to improperly profit from contracts 
let to Max Fonnesbeck to the prejudice of the defen· 
dant. 
Defendant initially attempted to make it appear 
that the Fonnesbeck contracts themselves were suspect 
and improper, but had to abandon this contention when 
the evidence established that these contracts were di-
rected by Mr. A. W. Sanders, defendant's chief exec· 
utive officer. Mr. Sanders was the one who requested 
that Max Fonnesbeck terminate his employment with 
the defendant and take these special construction jobs 
as an independent contractor, with a full realization 
that Fonnesbeck would have to reply on Bear Ri,,er 
personnel to do the techncial work required, because of 
the lack of other qualified men in the area. Another 
reason defendant beat a hasty retreat from the position 
that the contracts were improper was the evidence that 
developed showing that Bear River did not itself pay 
for these contracts, and that Thiokol financed the work 
and was very satisfied with the results thereof ( T. 482) . 
Defendant's evidence under this charge consisted 
of the testimony of several employees that they had 
participated in certain work at the Thiokol plant and 
on the central office equipment in the Tremonton office. 
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This evidence was supposed to establish that these Bear 
River employees performed work included in the Fon-
nesbeck contracts while on the payroll of the defendant, 
thus profiting the independent contractor to the expense 
of the defendant. All of these employees who testified 
for the defendant admitted on cross-examination that 
they did not personally know what the contract work 
consisted of and this fact alone negatived defendant's 
efforts under this charge (R. 339, 360, 371, 378). Addi-
tional proof conclusively established the baselessness 
of this accusation and the propriety of the conduct of 
both Don and Gene Chiodo, as well as }lax Fonnesbeck 
and Grant Allred, the independent contractors who 
were, in effect, accused of fraud and wrongdoing. 
Defendant relied on the testimony of one Steve 
Anderson, who testified he assisted Don Chiodo over a 
period of time in doing cable splicing on a Thiokol 
project, which defendant's brief now contends was 
identified by Fonnesbeck as being part of his contract. 
This statement, unsupported by any evidence, is false, 
for the testimony established that the cable splicing was 
not part of the Fonnesbeck contract at all, and had been 
actually let to another contracting firm known as Henk-
els-McCoy, which firm had been unable to finish the 
work because of labor difficulty, thereby requiring the 
Bear River employees to complete the cable splicing 
work (T. 544, 545). Max Fonnesbeck not only did not 
identify this as part of his contract, but expressly denied 
that this cable splicing was included in his work on the 
Thiokol project ( T. 500) . All of this testimony was 
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therefore meaningless, because Don Chiodo did this cable 
splicing as part of his employment with Bear River. 
That Don Chiodo normally did the cable splicing for the 
defendant was acknowledged by l\ilaurice Staples, the 
plant accountant (T. 459). 
Defendant's other main witness on this charge was 
one Jerry Jones, who testified that he adjusted some 
switches and wipers and worked on certain other equip-
ment in the central office of the defendant. A full deye]-
opment of this evidence, here again revealed that the 
work Jones had done was not contract work at all, but 
merely regular maintenance work which goes on continu-
ously in the defendant's telephone operation and which 
its employees are constantly being required to do ( R. 
518, 555). Both Grant Allred and Gene Chiodo ffatly 
denied that any of the contract work involviHg the 
central office was done by Bear River employees 011 
Bear River time ( R. 520, 552) . 
There was, of course, never any issue that both 
Don and Gene Chiodo performed valuable seniccs on 
their own time in order that the Fonnesbeck-Allr?d 
projects could be completed for Bear River and that 
they were paid for such effort. The evidence showe(l 
other Bear River employees also performed sueh work 
and these contracts were let at the direction of ... \. W. 
Sanders (R. 255, 256). The evidence further established 
these contracts were paid for by Thiokol with Ilear Rirer 
being merely a conduit for the money (R. 559) (Exhibit 
114). Max Fonnesbeck and Grant Allred, both of 
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1.dwm are responsible, reputable businessmen, testified 
that Don and Gene Chiodo performed their work in a 
l'ompetcnt manner and that they were not, in their 
opinion, overpaid for their services (T. 257, 289). 
Defendant's final charge of fraud against plaintiff 
,ms based upon a payment to plaintiff's fourteen-year-
old granddaughter for some $354.00 for the delivery of 
the Bear River Telephone Company directories. To 
establish this claimed fraud, defendant relies on the 
testimony of defendant's employee Sam 'Varner. :\fr. 
Warner claimed to have seen Don Chiodo helping his 
daughter deliver telephone directories one day while he 
was in town on a coffee break. ~Ir. 'Varner acknowl-
edged that he had on prior occasions also delivered the 
telephone books for additional compensation, as had 
other employees of the company. The defendant each 
year had paid for the delivery of the books the amount 
of postal charges that the company would lrnve had to 
pay if the directories had been mailed ( R. 470). The 
tt,~timony of plaintiff refuted this charge and established 
lbt there was nothing improper with such arrangement 
1 H. -Vi'OI. 
This accusation indicates the desperation of the 
clefe11dant in attempting by any means to justify the 
plaintiff's discharge. A similar example was the accusa-
tion made at the trial by defendant, again through 
testimony of l\Ir. Sam 'Varner, that plaintiff had given 
liis daughter, _l\Iary Anne, salary payments when she 
\\as !lot 'rnrking (R. 449-450). This charge was a ban-
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doned by defendant when the evidence established Mary 
Anne did office work and maintained certain records 
for the company at her home ( R. 534-538). 
(8) INSUBORDINATION 
Defendant charges that plaintiff was disobedient, 
disrespectful and unfaithful, and conununicated such 
insolence and disrespect to employees of Bear River 
Telephone Company. A review of the testimony in 
the record discloses that such charges were groundless, 
or that the acts complained of were provoked, and ap-
parently intentionally provoked. In support of this 
charge, defendant mentions an insurance contract that 
Bear River had with au insurance agent j, Brigli:r' 
City by the name of Brough. Plaintiff was directed to 
cancel this policy in April of 1961, a few months after 
he had been employed as manager of the company by 
the new owner. Plaintiff refused to terminate this policy. 
which he had negotiated for a five-year term prior to the 
acquisition of Bear River by General Waterworks (R. 
570). 
There was no denial of such refusal, but the refusal 
was not unreasonable, for it appeared that plaintiff 
responded to the direction to terminate and informed 
the New London officers that he felt a moral, as well 
as a legal commitment to abide by the terms of the 
insurance agreement which had been entered into by 
plaintiff for Bear River on the basis of bids, because of 
the fact that Mr. Brough had fully performed his end 
of the agreement (R. 561, 562). 
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This incident was one of the first following acqui-
sition wherein defendant, rather than plaintiff, breached 
the employment agreement and the understanding that 
it had made with plaintiff to permit him to continue 
to manage the defendant corporation following its acqui-
sition by General Waterworks, as he had in the past. 
35 Am. Jur., 1llaster and Servant, paragraph 34, 
page 478, states: 
"In order to constitute disobedience, the em-
ployee's conduct must have been wilful or inten-
tional, wilfulness being characterized by a wrong-
ful and perverse mental attitude rendering the 
employee's act inconsistent with proper subordi-
nation. An employer will doubtless be precluded 
from asserting violation of a rule or order as a 
justifiable ground for the discharge of an em-
ployee when it appears that he has waived com-
pliance \vith the rule or that the rule has been 
abrogated by habitual violations of which the em-
ployer has notice." 
The facts of this incident, occurring as it did some 20 
months prior to the plaintiff's dismissal, showed that 
the defendant waived compliance with this request and 
that the obvious reason for such waiver was the fact 
that plaintiff's refusal was entirely justified under the 
eiremnstances, and did not indicate a wrongful or per-
verse mental attitude. 
See also 35 Am. J ur., Master and Servant, para-
t;raph .50 at page 488, where a discussion of waiver or 
condonation of an employee's conduct states: 
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"The retention of an employee, however, after 
the actual discovery of an act of misconduct ou 
his part will, in some circumstances, warrant the 
inference that the act has been condoned, so as 
to be no longer available as a ground of dis-
missal." (Citing cases) 
This incident occurriug in April of 1961 with full knowl-
edge of the defendant, even if it could be called mis-
conduct, was waived or condoned. 
Defendant next recites certain communications 
from plaintiff to A. ,V. Sanders and Donald Bell, Saw;-
ders' successor in the New London offices, with resped 
to a l\Ir. Hanson, one of the General 'Vaterworks em-
ployees in New London, who became vice-president of 
defendant, and Mr. Cornwell, another staff officer of 
General 'V aterworks and Bear River in the New Lon-
don office. It is clear from the record that :Mr. Cornwell 
was a thorn in plaintiff's side almost immediately after 
the acquisition of the Bear River by General 'y ater-
works. At the time of the first meeting of the Benr 
River Board of Directors at Tremonton, Mr. Cornwell 
went out of his way to embarrass plaintiff by informing 
defendant's banker that checks signed by plaintiff should 
no longer be honored (R. 560). He also was the one 
that made a point in advising plaintiff that all def en-
dant's existing insurance policies would be cancelled. 
which prompted plaintiff's protest against the arbitrary 
chopping-off of the Casualty Fire Insurance Compan) 
policy with Mr. Brough (R. 562). The correspon<le11ce 
introduced indicating a dispute between l\ir. Cormrcll 
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and plaintiff regarding a Bliss Crandall, the defendant's 
billing agent in Provo, Utah, reflects that it was caused 
becaues of the interference in local management func-
tions by Mr. Cornwell, contrary to the understanding 
on which plaintiff sold his controlling stock in Bear 
River (Exhibit 24). 
This constant and continuing interference by the 
New London office with plaintiff's management of Bear 
River also explained, in part, the difficulty that devel-
oped with regard to Mr. Hansen. In this case, however, 
there was no personal misunderstanding between the 
two men ( R. 569) . Plaintiff became distressed because 
of certain engineering mistakes admittedly made by .IYir. 
Hansen which affected the service and operations of 
Rear River (R. 144). It is submitted that nothing was 
said or done by plaintiff toward Mr. Hansen or any 
other employee or officer of Bear River or General 
Waterworks that could be classified as insolence. Plain-
tiff did become exercised on several occasions because 
of the irritations that developed as a result of New 
London's interference and failure to permit him to 
ma11age the company as had been agreed. Under all of 
the circumstances it appeared that plaintiff exercised 
a remarkable amount of restraint. 
35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, paragraph 48, 
page 480, states: 
"Unprovoked insolence or disrespect on the 
part of the employee toward the employer, or 
the latter's representative may afford ground for 
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the discharge or dismissal of the employee prior 
to the conclusion of the term of employment." 
Even if it could be contended that such conduct 
amounted to insolence or disrespect, it certainly could 
not be classified as unprovoked. Any statements made 
by plaintiff regarding the competency of Mr. Hansen 
were justified in light of the errors committed by him 
and the serious and costly effect of such errors on the 
Bear River operation. 
Defendant complains that plaintiff directed Bear 
River employees to keep officers of the company in New 
London in the dark and told them not to send New 
London anything which was not specifically asked for. 
It was apparent why plaintiff did not wish his subordi-
nates to send information that had not been requested 
back to New London because of the continuing inter-
ference by New London in the Bear River operations. 
He did, however, expressly order all employees to send 
New London the information that had been requested. 
This is proper administrative control and procedure 
(R. 327, 461). 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff advised certain 
Bear River employees that there was going to be a court 
battle over his contract as early as six months after the 
sale, and said that "New London was trying everything 
they could to get him to resign as manager, and that 
he would not resign regardless of what they did" (R. 
489). It is difficult to understand why defendant would 
attempt to rely upon this conduct by plaintiff for, again, 
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it merely substantiates the obvious fact that New London 
was constantly interfering with the Bear River opera-
tion and provoking plaintiff by ref using to give him 
the autonomy, authority and respect that had been pro-
mised to him. See plaintiff's complaints about defen-
dant's failure to live up to the contract as testified to 
by defendant's witnesses (R. 324). See, also, page 19 
of Exhibit I, where plaintiff attempted to avoid such 
problems. 
It is understandable why plaintiff soon after the 
sale had occasion to feel that there might be a court 
battle over his contract. He had done everything he 
thought to be necessary to insure his right to retain the 
operational control and management of Bear River, 
even to the extent of having the understanding reported, 
transcribed and then affirmed. The almost immediate 
disregard of these commitments would certainly make 
any reasonable person believe that there might ulti-
mately be legal proceedings required to enforce his 
rights. As to .Mr. 'Varner's contentions that plaintiff 
said that he would do everything he could legally to get 
himself discharged, the obvious answer is that if plaintiff 
lllercly desired to be discharged, the quickest and best 
.::y to obtain this result would have been to run the 
l'ompany into the ground, rather than operate as he 
did, an efficient telephone company, providing good 
service and developing extremely high profits. It must 
be noted that Mr. Sam 'Varner was hardly an unbiased 
witness, and that a review of his cross-examination 
i·tveals that his credibility was thoroughly discredited. 
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Defendant cites a number of exhibits, claimiurr 
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their pertinence in establishing plaintiff's disobedience, 
insolence and disrespect. These exhibits, while impres-
sive in number when actually examined and understood 
do not bear out defendant's contention. VVhen consid-
ered individually in their proper context, they are found 
to be not nearly as damaging as contended, and fail to 
establish any unprovoked disobedience, insolence, or 
disrespect, merely reflecting the arbitrary interfereme 
of New London with plaintiff and the Bear River opera-
tions, contrary to defendant's initial commitments to 
the plaintiff. 
(C) DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff's action in in-
forming the Public Service Commission of Utah and 
the R.E.A. in August of 1961 of pending negotiations 
between Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company and General Waterworks for the exchange 
of Bear River Telephone Company properties, was in 
direct and flagrant violation of its orders to keep such 
negotiations secret. The evidence is not clear that .!\Ir. 
Chiodo was ever explicitly instructed not to mention this 
matter to anyone, but it is reasonable to assume that 
General Waterworks did not want any broad public 
disclosure of this fact, particularly because of its prior 
assurances to the Public Service Commission as well as 
the Plaintiff but a few months before, that it was uot 
buying with any intention of resale. 
Mr. Chiodo was justified in making the limited dis-
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closure of this transaction that he made, because of the 
fact that he had cooperated with General \V aterworks 
in making a personal assurance to the State Public 
Service Commission that General Waterworks intended 
to operate Bear River and had no intention of specula-
tion and resale, and because of the fact that he had been 
told that General \Vaterworks was going to terminate 
his employment if the transfer of the Bear River prop-
erties was concluded. It is submitted that there is nothing 
unreasonable in Mr. Chiodo's conduct when all of the 
facts and circumstances are considered. He had insisted 
as part of his sale that the purchaser must intend to buy 
the property to operate and not turn around and resell. 
Here again, his conduct was justified by the flagrant 
Yiolation of General \Vaterworks and Bear River of 
their prior commitments, and did not, therefore, con-
stitute a breach by plaintiff. Furthermore such claimed 
disobedience was condoned and was clearly not willful 
or peryerse ( R. 563, 564) . 
Defendant concludes this charge by contending 
that immediately after the meeting in Denver, Vincent 
Cliioclo declared war on Bear River Telephone Company 
and did everything in his power to cause trouble and 
problems for the company. No specific facts were cited 
for this accusation, nor does any evidence support it. 
The Lest answer to this completely false charge is, of 
eourse, the indisputed fact that under plaintiff's con-
tin11ing management Bear River continued to provide 
it~ customers good service and made its owner, General 
Waterworks Corporation, more money than any of its 
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other telephone properties (R. 126, 127, 192). 
(0) DISLOYALTY 
It soon appeared, following the acquisition by Gen-
eral 'Vaterworks of Bear RiYer that the many promises 
made to the plaintiff to induce him to sell his stock 
including those that General 'Vaterworks purchased 
the property to operate, not resell, and the broad man-
agement powers to be given to the plaintiff had been 
false and misleading. These broken promises by defen-
dant explain and excuse plaintiff's contacting a repre-
sentative of J. A. Hogle Company in an attempt to 
repurchase the Bear RiYer stock from General 'Vater-
works. This action took place approximately a mo11tl~ 
after plaintiff had been advised of General 'Vaterworks' 
intentions to resell Bear River to Mountain States. 
Plaintiff's conduct was not disloyal because he had been 
advised shortly before of General "\Vaterworks' desire 
to sell the Bear River properties and its intentions to 
terminate plaintiff's services if such sale was accom-
plished. 
In light of these facts can it be said that plaintiff's 
attempt to purchase control of Bear River back from 
General "\V aterworks was either improper or unfaithful 
and, if so improper and unfaithful, to whom? Certain!~· 
not improper and unfaithful to Bear River. The at-
tempted purchase of stock from General ''Va terworks 
was not a breach of any responsibility that plaintiff 
might owe as manager of Bear River Telephone Com-
pany. Such attempt on his part stemmed from an 
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understandable desire to not only protect himself, but 
also to preserve the company that he had built in a life-
time of effort, namely, Bear River Telephone Company, 
and insure that it would be owned and operated by a 
responsible organization. There was, therefore, nothing 
unfaithful to the defendant, Bear River Telephone Com-
pany's interests in the plaintiff's action in attempting 
to repurchase the stock. 
(El FAILURE TO RENDER PROPER ACCOUNTS 
Defendant urges that plaintiff failed to collect 
proper charges from customers to the prejudice of the 
defendant. Defendant again relies on the testimony of 
Mr. Sam 'Varner in support of this accusation, which 
concerned charges to Thiokol for the watts bands and 
certain advertising accounts. This charge demonstrates 
the tremendous diligence and ingenuity defendant exer-
cised in reviewing and reconstructing every transaction 
that took place during the three years plaintiff managed 
the Benr RiYer Telephone Company in a desperate 
effort to find anything that might be questionable or 
embarrassing. Many hours were obviously spent inter-
rogating employees and reviewing records endeavoring 
to deYelop anything possibly prejudicial 
The substance of this charge was that an adjust-
ment wcs required of the watts bands charges to Thiokol 
for a period of some six months and that a credit was 
allowed Thiokol against the required additional charge, 
hecause of a fire which occurred during the period caus-
ing an outage on the watts bands (R. 441, 442). Mr. 
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Warner did not testify that there was anything improper 
about the charge or the method of handling the matter, 
but contended that plaintiff stated that it was not up 
to the local office to determine if the charge produced 
a profit or a loss and that because New London had all 
the figures involved, it was up to tpem to make this 
determination (R. 444). Mr. David Jensen, Thiokol 
Supervisor of Communication, affirmed the fire inter-
ruption of the watts bands service and that a credit was 
given as a result thereof ( R. 484) . Sam \Varner 
acknowledged that New London did have, in fact, all 
of the information that Tremonton had, with respect 
to the watts bands service and billings (R. 494). 
There was a similar accusation regarding certain 
advertising billings which Mr. '1Varner contended re-
sulted in a small loss to the defendant corporation and 
that when he pointed this out to the plaintiff, plaintiff 
responded that it was up to New London to make any 
changes in charges because they had the same informa-
tion that Tremonton had. Mr. Warner again acknowl-
edged this to be the fact and thereby admitted that 
plaintiff had done nothing that was not done with the 
full knowledge of the New London office, or that was 
improper or prejudicial to the defendant's interests. 
How defendant can now claim that because it might 
have lost several hundred dollars on certain advertising 
billings, it can use this to justify the termination of the 
plaintiff, when the record shows that plaintiff produced 
greater net profits in the Bear River operation than any 
other property owned by General Waterworks, is diffi-
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cult to understand. 
(F) FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE INFORMATION 
Defendant's final effort to justify its termination 
of plaintiff's employment is based on the charge that 
plaintiff permitted two employees, Sam Warner and 
Maurice Staples, to do some extra work as janitor and 
automotive repairman respectively on a straight time 
basis, rather than on overtime, without communicating 
this information to the New London office. It is obvious 
that plaintiff was here trying to save money for the 
Jef endant and the he personally received no benefit 
whatever from these arrangements. Whether, in fact, 
there was an actual violation of the Federal \Vage and 
Hour Law under such arrangements is very question-
able because both of these men held office jobs and, in 
effect, contracted to perform additional and totally 
unrelated duties on their own time under separate con-
tracts. Defendant was not sufficiently concerned about 
this conduct to terminate the services of either \Varner 
or Staples, despite the fact that Warner, the office 
manager, admitted that he had requested the additional 
work and could see nothing wrong with the way the 
arrangement was handled ( R. 493) . (Exhibit 35) . 
It is submitted that plaintiff's actions were not 
incompatible with the faithful performance of his duties, 
nor did they render him in any way unfit for his job. 
Such an accusation implying that plaintiff hired these 
men to perform these menial tasks for the purpose of 
getting defendant in trouble with the Wage and Hour 
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Law is patently absurd. This charge further shows 
defendant's desperate effort to develop anything that 
might justify its discharge of the plaintiff. 
It is a fundamental rule of law that in any action 
by an employee against his employer for wrongful dis-
charge, the burden of providing justification for the 
discharge falls on the employer. For a recital of this 
recognized rule by the Supreme Court of Utah, see 
R u.ssell vs. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co., 247 1 
P.2d 257. It is respectfully submitted that defendant 
failed to present any substantial, preponderating evi-
dence establishing that the plaintiff committed a material 
breach of his employment contract by an unexcused 
failure to substantially perform the work he contracted 
to do or by a serious violation of the duty of loyalty or 
obedience. (Restatement of Agency Section 409.) It, 
therefore, failed to sustain its burden in this case of 
justifying plaintiff's discharge. 
III. THE ORAL OPINION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT IS NOT INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT AND IN ANY EVENT MAY 
NOT BE USED TO IMPEACH SUCH FIND-
INGS AND JUDGMENT. 
The trial court made the following Findings of 
Fact with respect to the plaintiff's performance of his 
employment agreement and the grounds urged by the 
defendant in attempting to justify his discharge: 
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5. Pursuant to the said contract of employ-
ment, plaintiff, Vincent Chiodo, immediately 
upon the assumption of control of Bear River 
Telephone Company by General Waterworks 
Corporation, entered into his duties as General 
Manager of Bear River Telephone Company 
and carried on such duties as general manager 
of Bear River Telephone Company faithfully 
and efficiently up to and including the 6th day 
of December, 1963. 
6. On or about the 6th day of December, 1963, 
Bear River Telephone Company without just 
cause and excuse, and in violation of the terms of 
its agreement with Vincent Chiodo, did discharge 
the said Vincent Chiodo as manager of Bear 
River Telephone Company and as a result and 
by virtue of such discharge the defendant, Bear 
River Telephone Company, has refused and de-
clined to pay to the said Vincent Chiodo a salary 
as manager of Bear River Telephone Company 
beyond the 10th day of December, 1963, to the 
damage of the said Vincent Chiodo in the sum 
of $84,676.93. 
7. That plaintiff, Vincent Chiodo, did not 
breach the terms and provisions of the employ-
ment contract in any manner as to warrant the 
termination of his employment or the refusal of 
the defendant, Rear River Telephone Company, 
to make the payments required to be made there-
under, nor to entitle said defendant to any set-
off or counterclaim against the amounts to be 
paid thereunder. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
made the f oJlowing Conclusions of Law: 
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4. The llear River Telephone Company, on 
the 6th day of December, 1963, terminated the 
employment of the plaintiff, Vincent Chiodo, 
effective December 10, 1963, which termination 
was without just and sufficient cause and was in 
violation of the terms and provisions of the em-
ployment agreement between the parties. 
It is a fundamental rule that oral or written opin-
ions of the trial court cannot be looked to to ascertain 
what the Court has found or decided and that the Court's 
F'indings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
must alone be looked to for that purpose, and further 
that such Findings and Conclusions cannot be qualified 
or limited by any prior oral or written opinion by the 
Court. See fV asatch Oil Refining Co. vs. JV ade, 92 
Utah 50, 63 P.2d 1070, 1075. 
This rule is set forth in the California Distrid 
Court of Appeals case Shaha vs. Frey, 277 P.2d 4:28, 
where the Court said at page 430: 
"It is the rule that no resort may be had to the 
language of the court in discussing the evidence 
at the conclusion of the trial where the finding is 
unambiguous and the record supports it. The 
written finding is the ascertainment of tlw fad 
by the Judge. It is the court's decision upon the 
facts. The reasoning of the Judge in announciug 
his decision is not such part of the record as mar 
be used for the purpose of establishing a fact 
in a case where the findings are filed." 
In the case of Lieberrnan vs. Atlantic Mutual In-
surance Cornpany, 385 P.2d 53, the appellants attempted 
to impeach the finalized findings of the Court by frr· 
41 
quent references to the trial judge's original oral opin-
ion, much as appellants are attempting to do in this 
case. The Supreme Court in Washington held on page 
.54 that: 
"Remarks contained in an oral opinion of the 
trial judge will not be considered by this Court 
insofar as they conflict with the final formal find-
ings and judgment as made and entered by the 
trial judge." 
The Washington Court cited cases stating that if the 
trial judge's oral decision is at variance with the find-
ings, such decision cannot be used to impeach the find-
ings or judgment, but when such decision is consistent 
therewith, the findings and judgment may be read in 
its light. 
See also Hixson vs. Cook, 379 P.2d 677, where the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a judge's oral 
remarks made at the conclusion of the evidence which 
were not incorporated into the decree appealed from 
coulcl not be used to reverse such decree. 
A reading of the full statement made by the trial 
court ( R. 589 to R. 593; R. 596 to R. 597) reveals that 
the court's comments are not inconsistent with the Find-
ings and Conclusions subsequently made by the court. 
The Court's statement that the plaintiff's conduct had 
11ot heen "lily white" and that New England honesty 
might not uphold the somewhat minor acts of the 
plaintiff do not establish, as defendant contends, that 
rhe Court was convinced that the activities charged 
against plaintiff by the defendant did all in fact occur. 
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Nor are the statements by the Court regarding a lower-
ering of the community standards and prevalence of 
unorthodox employment practices in the community 
in conflict with the formal Findings and Conclusions, 
wherein the Court expressly found that plaintiff did 
not breach his employment contract in any manner 
warranting the termination by defendant of such em-
ployment. 
Defendant urges that the Court's determination in 
effect condoned the actions of plaintiff which reflected 
that he considered the stockholders of Bear River and 
the users of its services as "fair game". This charge 
is entirely without justification or support in the evi-
dence, which on the contrary established that the llear 
River Company under plaintiff's management pro-
vided its owner, General Waterworks, with the best 
return and profit of any of its numerous telephone 
subsidiaries and further that the service rendered to 
its customers was good (R. 126, 127, 192). 
Throughout defendant's brief it assumes that all 
charges made by it were clearly established and that 
the Court was convinced of the truth of such charge.~. 
There is no support for this assumption, for plaintiff 
presented substantial, competent, believable evidence 
refuting such charges, which evidence was obviously 
accepted and believed by the trial court, as refiected 
in its Findings, Conclusions and Judgment. 
Defendant attempts to torture the language of 
the Court's oral statement in an attempt to convince 
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this Court that the trial court found that while plain-
tiff did the things defendant claim, defendant could 
not rightfully discharge him because they had condoned 
his actions. It is submitted that a fair reading of the 
Court's language thus relied upon by defendant indi-
cates that such was not the Court's meaning nor inten-
tion. This language cited in the defendant's brief on 
page 46 and found in the record at pages 590 and 591 
indicates that the Court believed the conduct of the 
parties during plaintiff's three year employment sup-
ported plaintiff's contention with respect to the breadth 
and scope of his management powers and helped estab-
lish the admissibility and materiality of plaintiff's Ex-
hibit l. In other words, this is a completely specious 
issue, for the Court was not discussing condonation 
at all, but was merely indicating that the parties' actions 
over the three year employment period substantiated 
plaintiff's contention that he was to be given unusually 
broad management powers under his employment con-
tract as had been negotiated for by him and agreed 
to by A. W. Sanders in the recorded discussion tran-
scribed in Exhibit I. 
IY. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE WAS 
NOT VIOLATED NOR WAS THE EMPLOY-
MENT AGREEMENT VARIED. 
Defendant under its Point IV asserts that although 
it has assumed, for the sake of argument, in its prior 
Pomts I, II, and III that the employment contract 
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in question could be varied by the parol evidence intro- . 
duced by the plaintiff relative to the negotiations lead- ! 
ing up to the written contract that such evidence was '1 
actually not admissible. Defendant contends that all 
evidence of the prior negotiatio~s le~ding up to the \ 
written contract of employment, mcludmg the verbatim ! 
report of the discussion between A. W. Sanders and 
1 
plaintiff (Exhibit I) should not have been considered j 
by the Court for the purpose of varying or interpreting 1 
the written agreement, and cites in support of this con- ' 
tention, Corbin on Contracts, Section 573, to the effect 
that antecedent understandings and negotiations are 
not admissible "for the purpose of varying or contra-
dicting the writing". 
Plaintiff has no argument with the citation from 
Corbin for it is the recognized "parol evidence rule", 
but plaintiff submits this does not bar Exhibit "I" or 
evidence regarding the circumstances under which the 
employment contract was negotiated, for such evidence 
does not vary or contradict the writing. In Corbin's 
One Volume Work on Contracts, at page 575. the ' 
author says, "prior agreements or understandings, oral 
or written, are not affected by a subsequent contract 
if they are not inconsistent in their meaning or opera· 
tion. This is true even though they deal with the same 
subject matter". As Corbin pointed out in Section 573, 
cited in defendant's brief, the key issue is whether the 
parties assent to the particular writing as the com-
plete and accurate "integration" of that contract. 
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Defendant, in support of its position that nothing 
can be considered to show the intent of the parties 
outside the bare details of the simple two-page docu-
ment, cites an article written by Ronan E. Degnin on 
"Parol Evidence-the Utah Version" found in 5 Utah 
Law Review, Fall Edition of 1956, wherein the writer 
indicates a latter agreement supersedes all former agree-
ments not because the former agreements are untrust-
worthy, but because they are legally immaterial. The 
paragraph cited from Professor Degnin's article by 
defendant is not clear unless the following paragraph, 
which is the significant portion, is also read. In this 
paragraph at the top of page 163 the writer states: 
"The key or shorthand expression to all of this 
is 'integration' ... if the prior dealings of the 
parties have been integrated or embodied in a 
written or oral agreement, the latter and that 
alone controls the legal relationship between 
them. Whether or not the prior dealings have 
been integrated is a question of intent of the par-
ties. Primarily this intent is to be sought in the 
writing itself, by comparing it with the terms 
offered to be proved by parol. Are the latter such 
that reasonable men would deem them abandoned 
when the writing was adopted, or could they exist 
consistently with the terms of the writing?" 
Plaintiff submits that the evidence was clear and un-
controverted that the detailed commitments made to 
him with respect to his employment were not abandoned 
hut on the contrary were confiirmed and that there 
was nothing inconsistent about them with the terms 
of the written contract. 
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In the Restatement of Contracts, Paragraph ~28. 
which deals with "integration", the authors state, "'An 
agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt 
a writing or writings as a final and complete expression 
of the agreement. An integration is the writing or 
writings so adopted." In commenting on this para-
graph at page 308, the authors say, "It is an essential 
of an integration that the parties shall have manifested 
assent, not merely to the provisions of their agreement. 
but to the writing or writings in question as a final 
statement of their intentions as to the matters con-
tained therein". Plaintiff challenges the defendant to 
point out to the court any evidence which would in<li-
ca te an assent by him that the two-page document 
contained a final and complete statement of the inten-
tions of the parties as to the plaintiff's employment 
agreement. 
Corbin in his work on Contracts, in Paragraph 
543, states "court's attempt to give to the words of a 
contract the meaning expressed by the parties or if 
giving the meaning of only one of the parties, basing 
such decision on the fact that the other party knew or 
had reason to know of the meaning attached to s11l'h 
words of the first party". There was no eYidence 
presented to the effect that the plaintiff knew or had 
reason to believe that the prior understandings that 
had been reached with respect to his employment con-
tract and, particularly, as reflected in the verbatim 
report of his detailed conversation with Mr. A. W 
Sanders, had been rejected or abandoned and, on the 
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contrary, all of the evidence supports the proposition 
that he clearly understood and was led to believe by 
General Waterworks and then Bear River that such 
agreements and understanding were still in full force 
and effect and were incorporated in the short, two-
page employment contract that was executed in J anu-
ary, upon the acquisition of Bear River by General 
Waterworks. 
The language of the agreement saying that it was 
"to confirm our understanding and agreement which 
we have arrived at" certainly led plaintiff to believe 
this when nothing had been said or done indicating 
to the contrary. At the very least, such language creates 
some uncertainty and ambiguity in the agreement and 
under the fundamental principal of construction any 
uncertainty or ambiguities in an agreement are con-
strued against the party preparing such agreement. 
One of the key words in this contract is the word 
"confirm". Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, de-
fines this word to mean "to complete or establish that 
which was incomplete or uncertain-to ratify what has 
been done without authority or insufficiently." This, 
nut only is a technical legal definition, but is what a 
layman such as plaintiff would naturally assume this 
to mean. 
In Read vs. Forced Underfiring Corporation, 26 
P. 2d 325 (Utah, 1933) at Page 327, the Supreme 
l'ourt of this State said: 
"Where language is mixed and susceptible of 
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more than one construction, the court should 
attempt to place itself as nearly as possible in the 
situation of the parties to the contract at the time 
the contract was entered into, so that it may view 
the circumstances as viewed by the parties them-
selves to be enabled to understand the language 
used in the sense, with which the parties used it. 
In order to accomplish this purpose it is generally 
proper for the court to take notice of the sur-
roundings and attendant circumstances and con-
sider the language used in the line of such cir-
cumstances.'' 
This Read case also concerned an employment con-
tract in the form of a letter prepared by the defendant 
corporation and in construing this letter, the court 
recognized the established rule of construction men-
tioned hereinabove with the following statement also 
on page 327: 
"It is a familiar rule of construction that the 
language used must be construed most strongly 
against the person using it. In this case, the con-
tract is in the form of a letter written bv the 
defendant corporation to the plaintiff in ~hich 
they set out the details of the employment." 
In order to fulfill this requirement as set out by our 
Supreme Court, it was necessary for the trial court 
to view all of the surrounding circumstances of the 
employment contract and consider the language ol' 
the contract in light of such circumstances. This woul<l 
of necessity require the court to consider the prelimi-
nary discussions and agreements reached with respect 
to this employment agreement. 
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Another Utah case which holds that all of the 
fads surrounding a writing may be viewed in order 
to understand the intentions and agreements of the 
parties is Hawaiian Equipment Company vs. Eimco 
Corporation, 207 P. 2d 794 (Utah, 1949), where the 
court quoted 17 C.J.S. Contracts, Paragraph 327, Page 
751, as follows: 
" ... a man is responsible for ambiguities in his 
own expressions and has no right to induce an-
other to contract with him on the supposition that 
the contract means one thing while he hopes the 
court will adopt the construction to mean another 
thing more to his advantage." 
Here, when the defendant, Bear River, executed 
the employment agreement with the plaintiff, it knew 
of his requirements with respect to such employment 
agreement as expressed to ~Ir. A. W. Sanders and 
that such requirements had been agreed to by General 
Waterworks. Therefore. when Bear River executed 
the exact form of agreement that had been settled 
upon between plaintiff and General 'Vaterworks to 
reflect their understanding, it knew what the language 
of wch agreement meant to the plaintiff, namely. that 
his conditions and requirements were being met and 
incorporated in this agreement. 
The Supreme Court of Ptah, m the more recent 
case of Maw v.-1. Noble, 10 ll. (2d) 444, f354 P. 2d, 
121, 12:3, amplified the strict construction rule against 
thP party who draws an instrument with an even more 
realistic one, as follows: "The primary and more fun-
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damental rule is that the contract must be looke<l at 
realistically in the light of the circumstances under 
which it was entered into, and if the intent of the parties 
can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, it must 
be given effect." 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case 
and pursuant to the legal authorities recited herein-
above the commitments and agreements made by the 
defendant to the plaintiff set forth in Exhibit I, were 
a part of the plaintiff's contract of employment. See 
Laskey vs. Rubell Corporation, 303 N.Y. 69, 100 N.E. 
2d 140, where the court held that while parol evidence 
cannot be used to modify the terms of a contract of 
employment that has been reduced to writing, such 
evidence may be used to supply details that were not 
reduced to writing. See also Ross vs. Stricker, (Okla. 
1953) 275 P.2d, 991, where the court held that where 
a written employment agreement refers to or recognizes 
the existence of other agreements, that such other agree-
ments may be proved on the basis that there was more 
to the agreement than appeared in the written letter. 
In this case the plaintiff was actually led to believe 
that the transcript was incorporated in the two page 
letter contract and the language of such letter contract 
corroborates this fact. It should be remembered that 
at the conclusion of this transcript discussion between 
plaintiff and A. ,V. Sanders, which was affirmed sub-
sequent to the delivery to the plaintiff of the letter 
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agreement it was specifically agreed that such tran-
script would be the governing factor in any future 
disputes regarding plaintiff's employment and that if 
any questions might arise regarding such employment 
they would be settled on the basis of the discussion 
as transcribed. (See page 45 of Exhibit I.) 
What, then, is the legal result of the agreement 
reached between the defendant and the plaintiff regard-
ing his employment? It would seem clear from the 
facts and circumstances that plaintiff was promised a 
ten year employment contract as a required condition 
of his stock sale and that in connection with such em-
ployment, he was to remain the manager of Bear River 
with the autonomy and freedom he had had in his 
past operations in the company. These requirements 
of the plaintiff were acknowledged by Helmer Hansen 
(T. 142 and 146) and were agreed to by A. ,V. San-
ders, 'Tice President of General 'Vaterworks and man-
ager of this telephone utility, in the Y erbatim Report 
of their discussion (Exhibit I). \Ve direct the court's 
attention particularly to page 27 of Exhibit I, be-
ginning at Line 18, and the language which there 
follows over to the bottom of page 29. 
\Vhether or not the plaintiff was promised that 
he would receive $500.00 every two weeks, even if de-
fendant decided to fire him, was specifically discussed 
in this transcript beginning at the said line 18, page 27 
of Exhibit "I". A fair interpretation of the discussion 
that followed indicates clearly that this commitment 
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was made to him. 
It was not, however, necessary for plaintiff to rely 
upon this commitment, for the evidence shows that he 
faithfully discharged the managerial duties contein. 
plated in his employ~ent agreement with Bear River 
Telephone Company and that Bear River Telephone 
Company terminated him without just or legal cause. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE 
PROPER RULE OF DAl\IAGES AND DE-
FENDANT FAILED TO PRESENT ANY En. 
DENCE IN l\<IITIGATION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
DAMAGES. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of RumU 
vs. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co., 122 Ut. 
107, 247 P.2d 257, has held the correct measure of 
damages for the breach of an employment contract 
by an employer, to be the amount the employee would 
have received as wages had the contract been per· 
formed, less what the employee has earned since the 
time of his discharge or what he might by reasonable 
diligence earn in other appropriate employment during 
the remaining term of his employment contract. The 
only evidence presented as to plaintiff's earnings since 
his discharge was the testimony of the plaintiff that 
he had earned some $.500.00 prior to the trial, but that 1 
he had been required to expend nearly $800.00 to do 
so, thereby realizing a net loss (R.-45). 
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Plaintiff was a man then 60 years of age who had 
devoted most of his productive years to the develop-
ment of the Bear River Telephone Company. It was 
obvious that plaintiff's employment opportunities were 
extremely limited and that he couldn't hope to find 
similar appropriate employment at his age, and would 
thus be limited to infrequent consulting work. In the 
case of Dixie Gl~s Co. vs. Pollak, 341 S.W. 2d 530, 
9I A.L.R. 2d, 662, cited by defendant in its brief, 
the court held that it was a matter of common knowl-
edge that a person 58 years of age cannot well com-
pete in the labor market. 
The burden of proving mitigation of the plain-
tiff's damages rests on the defendant, including the 
obligation to present evidence regarding plaintiff's 
employment opportunities. Defendant had the respon-
sibility of showing that plaintiff's unemployment was 
his own fault and that he could have. by reasonable 
diligence, secured other remunerative employment of 
a like character elsewhere. For cases supporting this 
generally accepted proposition see Davis vs. Sherry, 
et al, (Calif.) 202 P.2d IOI; Independent School Dis-
trict #65 vs. Stafford (Okla.) 257 P.2d 1092; and 
K rehhill zw. Goering, (Kan.) 293 P .2d 255. Another 
Oklahoma case, Ray vs. Board of Education, 153 P.2d 
230, put this rule another way by holding that proof 
of mitigation of damages is an affirmaitve defense so 
that prima facie measure of damages for breach of 
employment contracts by an employmer is the monthly 
salary established in the contract. 
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35 Am. J ur., 1llaster and Servant, Paragraph oO, 
page 494, recites this general rule that in an actiuu 
for alleged wrongful discharge the plaintiff is not bound 
to show affirmatively as a part of his case, that other .' 
employment was sought and could not be found, but \ 
may rest his case upon proof of the contract, its breach, \ 
and damages which are determined by the contract ' 
price for services. If the employer desires to mitigate 
damages by showing that the employee had employ-
ment or could have obtained employment by reason-
able diligence during the whole or any portion of the 
contract, the burden rests upon the employer to estab-
lish this fact. 
The defendant m this case failed to present any 
evidence in mitigation of the plaintiff's damages and. 
therefore, under the record before the trial court, the 
judgment awarded was proper and should be affirmed. 
It should be noted that the trial court followed the rule 
urged by the defendant and set forth in the Di.rie 
Glass Co. v. Pollak case, supra, and reduced to present ' 
value the unpaid contract payments by discounting 
them at the rate of 6% per annum. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a presumption that the judgment of the 
trial court was correct, and every reasonable intend-
ment must be indulged in favor of it. The burden of 
affirmatively showing error is on the party complaining 
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thereof. B1trton v. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile In-
stitution, 122 U 360, 249 P 2d. 514. 
The defendant wholly failed to sustain its burden 
in proving any reasonable justification for its termi-
nation of the plaintiff's employment as manager. The 
record fails to establish that the plaintiff did other than 
devote his full time and best efforts to the management 
of the Bear River Telephone Company. Defendant's 
charges of insolence, insubordination and disrespect 
were not borne out by the evidence, which show that 
the actions of the plaintiff complained of were pro-
voked and certainly not indicative of a wrongful or 
perverse mental attitude. Such acts by the plaintiff 
resulted from the continual harrassment and interfer-
ence of the plaintiff in his managerial functions con-
trary to the promises given him regarding his employ-
ment. 
The other attempts of defendant to justify the 
firing of the plaintiff also were lacking in proof. These 
attempts consisted in the main of the charge that 
plaintiff permitted a fraud to be perpetrated on Bear 
RiYer in the form of a conspiracy by Max Fonnesbeck, 
Grant AJlred, and Don and Gene Chiodo whereby 
these men realized improper profits for contract work 
done for Bear River. Defendant's evidence totally 
failed to support this charge and the testimony of Mr. 
Fonnesbeck, .Mr. Allred and Don and Gene Chiodo 
effedively answered and repudiated it. 
The trial court's findings, conclusions and judg-
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ment, bottomed as they were on sufficient, competent, 
believable evidence, requires this court to affirm the 
judgment of the trial court under familiar principles 
relating to appellate review. Home Electric Corpora-
tion vs. Russell, ____ U. ____ 409 P.2d 385. The defend-
ant's request to remand this case to the trial court for 
a determination of the amount plaintiff might earn 
1 
over the remaining period of the contract is likewise 
without merit for the defendant failed to meet its 
burden at the trial and present any evidence on which 
the court might base a reduction of the plaintiff's 
damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID K. 'i\T ATKISS 
WALTER G. MANN 
Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton & 'Vatkiss 
315 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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